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FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3020 
_____________ 
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v. 
 
RAHSEEM DRUMMOND, 
 
      Appellant 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of  Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 1-09-cr-00159-001 
District Judge: The HonorableYvette Kane                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 17, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
and STEARNS, District Judge

 
 
(Filed: May 18, 2012) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
                                                 
The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the United 
States District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
2 
 
STEARNS, District Judge.  
  
 On December 2, 2010, Rahseem Drummond pled guilty to two counts of 
using a communication facility in furtherance of drug trafficking, 21 U.S.C. § 
843(b).  On July 18, 2011, the District Court sentenced Drummond to ninety-six 
months in custody, one year of supervised release, and a $1,000 fine.  Drummond 
raises two issues on appeal: whether inculpatory statements he made to law 
enforcement agents should have been suppressed because he was not informed of 
his Miranda rights
1
 prior to the interrogation, and whether the sentence imposed 
was unreasonable under the circumstances.  We will affirm the District Court.  
BACKGROUND 
 Because we write exclusively for the parties, we set forth only those facts 
and procedural aspects that are relevant to our decision.  In early 2009, the 
Cumberland County Drug Task Force learned from several informants that 
Rahseem Drummond was importing marijuana from New Jersey for resale in the 
Chambersburg and Shippensburg area.  Among the informants was Drummond‟s 
(then) girlfriend, Channel Thomas, who also confided that Drummond was in 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun and a handgun.  Thomas admitted to 
accompanying Drummond regularly on his supply runs to New Jersey. 
On May 5, 2009, another confidential source (CS) told the investigators that 
                                                 
1
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Drummond was planning a trip to New Jersey the following day to purchase crack 
cocaine and marijuana.  Agents assisted the CS in renting a Chevrolet Impala to 
lend to Drummond for the New Jersey trip, and implanted the vehicle with a GPS 
device.  On the evening of May 5, Drummond, accompanied by Thomas and Orson 
Adams, a co-defendant, drove the Impala from Chambersburg to a hotel in St. 
Thomas, Pennsylvania.  There Drummond gave Thomas a large sum of cash to 
purchase drugs.  Leaving the Impala for the two couriers, Drummond took 
Thomas‟s car and drove himself home.2  Thomas and Adams continued on to New 
Jersey. 
On May 9, 2009, the CS alerted investigators that Thomas and Adams were 
on the way back to Chambersburg from New Jersey.  At the investigators‟ request, 
Pennsylvania State Troopers stopped the Impala on Interstate 81 and confiscated 
several pounds of marijuana from the trunk.  At the Harrisburg State Police 
barracks, while being booked, Thomas admitted to having what proved to be 99.7 
grams of crack cocaine in her pants. 
 In coordination with the stop of Thomas and Adams, the investigators, led 
by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Agent Keith Kierzkowski, stopped 
                                                 
2
 It appears that Thomas‟ car was already parked at the hotel in St. Thomas.  
See App. at 82.  
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Drummond in a car driven by Kierra Rice.
3
  Drummond was placed under arrest, 
and after being told of the arrest of Thomas and Adams, stated that he would “take 
the hit for the weed but not the crack.”  At this point, investigators had yet to learn 
that Thomas had crack cocaine in her possession.   
 On May 13, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Drummond, together with 
Thomas, Adams, and another conspirator, Carolyn Stratum, with multiple counts 
of federal drug crimes.
4
  On May 26, 2010, a second superseding indictment 
charged Drummond with seven counts, including two use of communication 
facilities counts to which he eventually pled guilty. 
 Prior to pleading guilty, Drummond sought to suppress both his post-arrest 
statements and the crack cocaine and marijuana seized from the rented Impala.  On 
February 4, 2010, after an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied both 
motions to suppress and scheduled the case for trial.  In December of 2010, 
Drummond entered into a plea agreement with the government.  Under the terms 
of the agreement, Drummond was permitted to plead guilty to the two use of 
                                                 
3
 Rice was found to have marijuana hidden in her purse and bra.  She told 
investigators that Drummond had given the drugs to her and that on several 
occasions Drummond had hired her to drive to New Jersey to pick up marijuana.  
  
4
  A superseding indictment adding a fifth defendant, Jason Morris, was 
returned on July 29, 2009.   
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facilities counts with respect to the marijuana only.
5
  Both Drummond and the 
government reserved the right to contest the issue of Drummond‟s responsibility 
for the crack cocaine at sentencing.  Drummond also reserved the right to appeal 
the District Court‟s suppression rulings. 
DISCUSSION
6
 
Drummond’s Motion to Suppress7 
On appeal, Drummond challenges only the refusal of the District Court to 
suppress the incriminating statement that he made to Agent Kierzkowski after his 
arrest.
8
  The essence of Drummond‟s argument is that there is no affirmative proof 
that he was informed of the entirety of his Miranda rights.  According to 
Drummond, the record establishes only that Agent Kierzkowski “read Mr. 
                                                 
5 The government agreed to dismiss the remaining five counts of the 
indictment. 
 
6
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
7
 We review “the District Court‟s denial of a motion to suppress for clear 
error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise[ ] plenary review of the 
District Court‟s application of the law to those facts.” United States v. Perez, 280 
F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 
(3d Cir. 1998)).   
 
8
 Agent Kierzkowski testified that after he told Drummond that Thomas had 
been arrested as well, he “said something to the effect of, I‟ll take the hit for the 
weed, but I‟m not going to take the hit for the crack, and that he‟s a weed guy and 
he sells weed, he has nothing to do with what‟s in that vehicle.” App. at 69.  
 
6 
 
Drummond his rights from a DEA 13A card.  However, Agent Kierzkowski never 
specified what he told Mr. Drummond.  Also, a DEA 13A card was never entered 
into the record.”  Appellant‟s Br. at 21.  Given this void, the argument continues, 
the District Court abused its discretion in rejecting Drummond‟s countervailing 
testimony that he was never told of his right to remain silent or to consult with an 
attorney. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “no person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  While 
“admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable,” 
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977), the Supreme Court in 
Miranda “presumed that interrogation in certain custodial circumstances is 
inherently coercive and held that statements made under those circumstances are 
inadmissible unless the suspect is specifically informed of his Miranda rights and 
freely decides to forgo those rights.”  New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 
(1984).
9
 The “Miranda rights,” while not constitutionally compelled, have a 
“constitutional underpinning,” and thus, they may not be rescinded by an act of 
Congress or be treated with anything but the most scrupulous regard by a 
                                                 
9
  The government does not contest the fact that Drummond was in custody 
when the incriminating statement was made. 
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reviewing court.  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 n.5, 444 (2000). 
The Miranda warnings are as follows: 
“[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the 
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in 
a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and 
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior 
to any questioning if he so desires.”  
 
Miranda, 376 U.S. at 479. 
 
At the September 3, 2009 suppression hearing, Agent Kierzkowski testified 
that after Drummond was told that he was under arrest, Kierzkowski advised 
Drummond of his Miranda rights by reading from a DEA 13A card.  “It‟s a 
Miranda warning waiver card.  It is provided to us, and I read it verbatim off this 
yellow card that I usually carry around my neck with my badge.”10  App. at 68.  
Drummond, for his part, testified that the agents had pulled him from the car with 
guns drawn, thrown him to the ground, belittled him, and after he was handcuffed, 
Kierzkowski violently beat him before placing him in the State Police cruiser.  He 
also testified that neither Kierzkowski nor any other officer advised him of his 
Miranda rights.  See id. at 92-99.  The District Court found Drummond‟s 
                                                 
10
 Agent Kierzkowski gave nearly identical testimony about his customary 
practice in reading the Miranda rights from his personal DEA 13A card in a 
separate case.  See United States v. Jones, 2007 WL 4365741, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 
12, 2007).  As in this case, the District Court in Jones credited his testimony and 
rejected the defendant‟s assertion that no Miranda warnings had been given. 
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testimony wholly incredible.
11
  By contrast, she found Kierzkowski‟s testimony 
persuasive and credible and thus denied the motion to suppress.  Id. at 144. 
This pretty much ends the matter.  Under the clear error standard, we will 
accept the District Court‟s factual determinations unless they are either (1) 
“completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility,” or (2) “bear[ ] no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary 
data.”  Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 1972).  See also United 
States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e will not review a 
district court‟s credibility determination.”).  We find no error in the District 
Court‟s ruling, much less a clear one. 
Drummond’s Sentence 
 Drummond argues that the District Court made both procedural and 
substantive errors in formulating his sentence.
12
  The 96-month sentence imposed 
                                                 
11
 The District Court stated that it was “not persuaded that Agent 
Kierzkowski punched Defendant in front of several other officers, including 
[Pennsylvania State Police] officers, for failing to respond to his un-Mirandized 
questioning.  Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant‟s testimony that 
he was not informed of the reasons for his arrest for several days – until his 
attorney arrived at the county jail – , that he asked for an attorney despite all 
officers‟ failure to inform him of his rights, or that any incriminating statements 
were completely fabricated by Agent Kierzkowski.”  Id. at 144.  The District Court 
also noted that Drummond had shifted his version of the supposed assault during 
his testimony and found that his “demeanor was unconvincing.”  Id.   
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by the District Court consisted of consecutive terms of imprisonment of 48 months 
on each of the two counts to which Drummond pled guilty.  Drummond contends 
that the District Court miscalculated the sentencing guidelines range (SGR) and 
improperly weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors.
13
  Specifically, he faults the 
District Court for: (1) holding him responsible for the 99.7 grams of crack cocaine 
seized from Thomas; (2) applying a two-level increase for possession of a deadly 
weapon; (3) applying a four-level increase for his supervisory role; (4) denying any 
credit for acceptance of responsibility; (5) declining to depart downward in 
recognition of the harsh conditions of his confinement at the Dauphin County jail; 
(6) declining to vary based on the lower sentences received by his co-defendants; 
and (7) declining to vary because of alleged “sentencing entrapment.”  
 We recently explained that  
 “Our review of a criminal sentence . . . proceeds in two stages.  First, 
we review for procedural error at any sentencing step, including, for 
example, failing to make a correct computation of the Guidelines 
range at step one, failing to rely on appropriate bases for departure at 
step two, or failing to give meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) 
factors at step three.”  [United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d 
Cir. 2011)] (internal citations and quotations omitted).  “If there is no 
                                                                                                                                                             
12
 “The abuse-of-discretion standard applies to both [the] procedural and 
substantive reasonableness inquiries.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 
(3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). 
 
13
 Based on Drummond‟s offense level of 34 and criminal history category 
IV, the SGR was calculated at 210-262 months; however, because of the statutory 
maximum of four years on each use of communications facilities count, the SGR 
was capped at 96 months.  
10 
 
procedural error, the second stage of our review is for substantive 
unreasonableness, and we will affirm the sentence unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence 
on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.”  Id. [citations omitted]. 
  
United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 
 The alleged errors can be disposed of in quick order.  The attribution 
of the crack cocaine found on Thomas to Drummond was reasonable given 
the predictive information supplied to Agent Kierzkowski by the CS (that he 
had been told by Drummond that Thomas and Adams had begun the journey 
back from New Jersey after successfully purchasing marijuana and crack 
cocaine), Thomas‟s confirmatory testimony at the sentencing hearing 
regarding the trip to New Jersey, and Drummond‟s blurting out on his arrest 
that “he wouldn‟t take the hit for the crack” before any of the officers had 
told him that crack had been seized.
14
  While some of the information on 
which the District Court relied was hearsay, as Drummond acknowledges, 
reliable hearsay is admissible at a sentencing hearing.  Appellant‟s Br. at 29.  
The hearsay at issue here had the virtue of being not only internally cross-
corroborating, but also corroborated by external events.  See United States v. 
Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2001) (“One factor evidencing the 
                                                 
14
 Thomas testified that the day prior to the New Jersey trip, she overheard 
Drummond and Adams talking about “how much money they can make . . . if they 
brought it [crack cocaine] back.”  
11 
 
reliability of hearsay statements . . . is external consistency.”).  See also 
United States v. Brothers, 75 F.3d 845, 848 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United 
States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 664 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The sentencing court can 
give a high level of credence to hearsay statements, going so far as to „credit 
hearsay evidence over sworn testimony, especially where there is other 
evidence to corroborate the inconsistent hearsay statement.‟”)).15 
 A four-level increase based on a leadership role in a criminal 
enterprise is warranted “[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a 
criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise 
extensive . . . .”  United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 3B1.1 
(emphasis added).  Drummond‟s argument that he did not supervise five or 
more criminal subordinates is beside the point.  Whether Keirra Rice, Jason 
Morris, and Paul Galdfelter
16
 (who seem to have been peripheral players) are 
counted in or out of the conspiracy, it was not unreasonable for the District 
                                                 
15
 Reliable hearsay also supported the two-level enhancement for possession 
of a deadly weapon.  Thomas testified that Drummond owned at least two guns – 
one of which she distinctly remembered because Drummond used it to threaten her 
during a domestic argument.  She also testified that on most occasions he carried a 
weapon (a knife) when they travelled to New Jersey to buy marijuana.  The 
Presentence Report noted that three other witnesses had told investigators that they 
had seen Drummond in possession of firearms on numerous occasions.    
 
16
 Galdfelter was another actor involved in Drummond‟s illegal dealings.  
12 
 
Court to have found Drummond‟s interstate drug trafficking activity 
“extensive.”   
Similarly, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to give 
Drummond credit for acceptance of responsibility.  A guilty plea does not 
guarantee a defendant the two-level decrease in his offense level otherwise 
authorized by USSG § 3E1.1.  “[A] defendant who falsely denies, or 
frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has 
acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.”  USSG § 
3E1.1, Application Note 1(a).  Having determined that Drummond lied 
under oath about the crack cocaine, the District Court was well within its 
discretion in concluding that Drummond had failed to accept full 
responsibility for his criminal conduct.  See United States v. Ceccarani, 98 
F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Guidelines make clear that „[t]he 
sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant‟s acceptance 
of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge 
is entitled to great deference on review.‟”) (quoting USSG § 3E1.1, 
Application Note 5).  
13 
 
 Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to 
properly weigh the § 3553(a) factors.
17
  With respect to the potential 
sentencing disparity between co-defendant Adams and Drummond, the 
District Court questioned the prosecutor and declared her satisfaction with 
the explanation that Adams had received a significantly lesser sentence 
recommendation based on willingness to cooperate with the DEA.  
Drummond‟s complaints about his conditions of confinement at the Dauphin 
County jail might find their place in an appropriate § 1983 due process 
action, see Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851, 853-854 (8th Cir. 1991), but 
as the District Court indicated, they have little if any relevance to 
punishment after conviction.  Finally, Drummond‟s theory of “sentencing 
entrapment,” like its twin theory of “sentencing factor manipulation,” has 
yet to be formally recognized in this Circuit, and we decline to consider it in 
a case like this one, where the facts would not support application of the 
theory even were we to adopt it.  See United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 229 
                                                 
17
 “[A]n appellate court reviews a sentence for reasonableness with regard to 
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). . . .  In order for a sentence to be 
reasonable, the record must demonstrate that the sentencing court gave 
„meaningful consideration‟ to these factors.”  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 
540, 542-543 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted).  
 
14 
 
(3d Cir. 2010).
18
  Discerning no procedural error in the imposition of 
Drummond‟s sentence, we also find no substantive error.  See Tomko, 562 
F.3d at 568 (“[I]f the district court‟s sentence is procedurally sound, we will 
affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.”).19 
Consequently, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                 
18
 Sentencing manipulation theories have had a largely hostile reception in 
other circuits.  See United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1279-1280 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1500 
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 672-673 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Walls, 
70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995).   
 
19
 It must be noted that Drummond received a significant discount in his 
potential sentence because of the government‟s decision to dismiss the five more 
serious charges as part of Drummond‟s plea agreement.  That decision effectively 
capped Drummond‟s sentence at 96 months, roughly 45 percent of the 210-month 
advisory minimum under the properly calculated SGR. 
